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Abstract
This brief paper shows how an exact analogue of Einstein’s ori-
ginal hole argument can be constructed in the loop representation
of quantum gravity. The new argument is based on the embedding
of spin-networks in a manifold and the action of the diffeomorph-
ism constraint on them. The implications of this result are then
discussed. I argue that the conclusions of many physicists working
on loop quantum gravity—Rovelli and Smolin in particular—that the
loop representation uniquely supports relationalism are unfounded.
1 Introduction.
Arguably the greatest unsolved puzzle of physics as we begin our march
through the 21st century is that of constructing a quantum theory of gravity;
i.e. the quantum theory that, minimally, has general relativity as a classical
limit. There is, of course, something of a profusion of competing approaches
each directed at resolving this puzzle.1 A particularly promising approach
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1As Duff put it in the first Oxford quantum gravity symposium: “many and manifold
and the methods of quantizing the gravitational field” ( [Duf78]). Smolin refers to the con-
tenders as “roads” in his recent popular account of the puzzle [Smo00]. There are several
possible ways of taxonomising the various approaches using, e.g., the level of background
dependence or the particular quantization method used. There are some—generally those
who have worked on many approaches—who believe that the approaches are converging
and can be seen as different aspects of the same underlying theory (cf. Baez [Bae96] and
Smolin (loc. cit.)).
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is the canonical quantization method known as loop quantum gravity.2 This
approach will be of most interest to philosophers of physics and of space and
time both because it says novel things about the structure of space and time
but also because it offers a quantization of the vacuum Einstein equations.
For this latter reason it gives those who dabble in the substantivalism vs rela-
tionalism debate a nice vantage point from which to argue for their preferred
conceptions of space and time.3 However, a philosopher looking at the recent
work in loop quantum gravity might easily be forgiven for thinking that the
debate is settled firmly in favour of relationalism. I certainly think it is fair
to say that the majority of physicists working on this approach see one of
its ‘lessons’ as showing that a relationalist conception of space and time is
the only way to make ontological sense of the theory, thus nestling under the
wings of their heros ‘papa Leibniz’ and ‘papa Einstein’. I suspect that the
hole argument of Earman and Norton [EN87]—along with their particular
way of characterizing relationalist and substantivalist positions via endorse-
ments and denials of Leibniz equivalence respectively—has played no small
role in this supposed vindication of relationalism.4 This paper will attempt
to show that this view is misguided. As regards the debate between substant-
ivalists and relationalists, we are in precisely the same situation we were in
with respect to the classical theory based on metric variables: both sides can
get a firm foothold.
I begin by reviewing the central details of the hole argument using the
canonical formalism with the metric as a ‘position’ variable and the extrinsic
curvature as the canonically conjugate ‘momentum’ variable. I place especial
emphasis on the importance of the diffeomorphism constraint in the function-
ing of the hole argument, and the importance of the treatment of these con-
2The level of pedagogy is already quite high with several textbooks and monographs
available that are devoted specifically to the subject: see any of [AT96,GP96,Rov04]. A
nice general review article is Rovelli [Rov99]— it can be found at http://relativity.
livingreviews.org/Articles/lrr-1998-1/.
3Of course, string theory—the other ‘big hitter’—adopts the stance that in order to
bring together general relativity and quantum theory one has to deal with all of the other
forces of nature too. I do not discuss this approach any further – I recommend Zweibach’s
new book on string theory to those who wish to learn more about it [Zwe04].
4This ‘contamination’ has recently spread into the problem of time in quantum gravity
with the appearance of Belot and Earman’s papers on the subject [BE99,BE01]. There
they attempt to align gauge-invariant views with relationalism and non-gauge-invariant
with substantivalism by arguing that the latter must countenance quantities that commute
with the constraints, but not so the former. I argue against this taxonomy in [Ric05].
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straints for matters of interpretation. I then show where spin-networks enter
the picture by introducing general relativity in the ‘new variables’ discovered
by Ashtekar and sketch the method of (constrained) quantization as applied
to them.5 Solving the quantum gauge-theoretic constraint associated with
the new variables leads to a space of states whose points are naturally separ-
ated by spin-networks. I then show how a hole argument can be constructed
for these states by considering the action of the diffeomorphism constraint
on them. I then draw from this some philosophical morals concerning the
ontological status of space and time.
2 Hole Arguments for General Relativity.
The hole argument is most easily couched in terms of models 〈M,D〉 (where
D is a set of dynamical fields on M — any further background fields are,
of course, absent in general relativity). Let us stick to the vacuum case and
therefore assume that D = g, so that the (Lorentzian) metric is the only
dynamical field on M. The models 〈M, g〉 then minimally correspond to a
‘bare’ manifold possessing only topological and differential structure along
with geometrical structure determined dynamically by g in accordance with
the vacuum Einstein equation:
Gµν = Rµν − 1
2
Rααgµν = 0. (1)
The crucial property of these models (equivalently: Einstein’s equations)
for the hole argument is that they are generally covariant : if 〈M, g〉 solves
the field equations then so does 〈M, φ∗g〉 , ∀φ ∈ Diff(M). The ‘pushed
forward’ field φ∗g will generally be different in the sense that, given a global
chart on M with coordinates {xi}, φ∗g(x) 6= g(x). However, it can happen
that φ∗g = g—i.e. that φ is a spacetime symmetry for g—even though
{xi}, φ∗g(x) 6= g(x). When this happens we have the beginnings of a hole
argument; there will be many metrics that solve the equations that will give
(locally) different results. Hence, choose a region of the manifold, H ⊂ M
(the hole), and suppose that we can solve completely for M−H (i.e., we
know g(x) , ∀x ∈M−H). Now let φH be a diffeomorphism that acts as the
5According to this formalism, an SU(2)-connection takes the place of the metric and an
orthonormal triad takes the place of the extrinsic curvature, thus making the phase space
of general relativity resemble that of a Yang-Mills theory.
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identity on M−H but not within H (nor on the boundary ∂H): then the
field equations do not uniquely determine g(x) for x ∈ H for both g(x) and
φ∗g(x) are solutions, and yet φ∗g(x) 6= g(x). If we put the hole to the future
of some initial slice then this signals a violation of determinism!
In order to properly appreciate the workings of hole argument (qua prob-
lem of determinism, at any rate), one has to shift to the canonical (con-
strained Hamiltonian) formulation of general relativity and thus construct
its phase space Γ. This move will allow us to connect the discussion up to
the newer formulations of general relativity with different dynamical fields
playing the role of the metric; to gauge theories; and it will also pave the
way for the presentation of the quantum gravitational hole argument. Let
us quickly review the basic form of a hole argument from this perspective.
For now, I couch the discussion in the canonical formalism based on met-
ric variables—as, I assume, was intended in Earman and Norton’s original
presentation and as is brought out in [BE99,BE01]. Thus, firstly we take
spacetime to be a four-dimensional manifold M diffeomorphic to S × R –
with S a (compact, orientable) 3-manifold taken to represent ‘space’ and
where R is taken to represent ‘time’. We choose S so that it is spacelike with
respect to g and so that it is a Cauchy surface – let’s call this surface Σ.
Let t be the function on M associated with the foliation by Σ and whose
level surfaces are the leaves of the foliation. A phase space is then construc-
ted by taking the basic variables of the theory to be the 3-metric qab on Σ
(playing the role of canonical ‘position’ variable) and pab (playing the role
of canonical ‘momentum’ variable conjugate to qab)
6 — both are induced by
the 3+1 ‘split’ together with g. Thus, an instantaneous state of the grav-
itational field is given by pairs (q, p) ∈ Γ. However, not any old pairs will
do. The 4-dimensional diffeomorphism invariance of the covariant theory is
translated into a pair of constraints on the initial data (Σ, q, p) so that they
must satisfy:
Da(q, p) = −2qac∇bpbc = 0 (2)
H⊥(q, p) = det(q)−1/2[qacqbd − 1
2
qabqcd]p
abpcd − det(q)1/2 3R = 0 (3)
6The momentum variable is related to the extrinsic curvature Kab of Σ by pab ≡
det(q)1/2(Kab −Kccqab), where Kab describes the embedding of Σ in (M, g)).
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This analysis brings out the gauge theoretic aspects of general relativ-
ity. In phase space terms we see that the full phase space Γ does not cor-
rectly represent the physically possible worlds of general relativity, for not
all points will satisfy the constraints. However, the points that do satisfy
the constraints form a submanifold of Γ known as the constraint surface C.
The connection to the hole argument is pretty clear: the spacetime diffeo-
morphisms correspond to gauge motions generated by the constraints. The
relevant constraint for the hole argument is Da since this generates spatial
diffeomorphisms of Σ. The gauge motions act on all points of Γ including
those points lying within C, but they have the property of leaving these latter
points invariant since they generate gauge transformations on C.
Recasting the hole argument in phase space terms allows us to connect
up the interpretive difficulties it engenders to those generic to gauge theories
(cf. Belot & Earman [BE99,BE01]). This way we see that the problem that
was seen to be faced by substantivalists arises from a supposed one-to-one
link between the points of phase space (in this case C) and physical possib-
ilities. The problem is that points will occupy gauge orbits and, therefore,
those within the same orbit will represent physically indistinguishable states
of affairs. If one wants to say that these points represent distinct possibilities
then one faces an indeterminism, but it is an indeterminism that faces any
one-to-one interpretation of a gauge theory. Aside from biting the bullet and
living with it, there are several methods of escaping this indeterminism: (1)
one can adopt a many-to-one interpretation, so that one and the same phys-
ical possibility is being multiply represented by the gauge-equivalent models;
(2) one can select a single model from the equivalence class as the ‘true’
representative; or one can (3) factor out the gauge symmetry by forming the
reduced space of orbits (option (3) is also known as ‘solving the constraints’).
Let us call the one-to-one interpretation a direct interpretation and call (1)-
(3) indirect, selective, and reductive interpretations respectively. Of course, a
live issue in recent discussions of the hole argument is the question of whether
the substantivalist is necessarily committed to this direct interpretation. A
group of philosophers—dubbed “sophisticated substantivalists” by Belot &
Earman ( [BE01]: 247)—have argued that the substantivalist is not neces-
sarily thus committed and that, in fact, substantivalists can help themselves
to interpretations that were thought to be unique to relationalists.7 Let me
7For example, Maudlin’s ‘essentialist substantivalism’ [Mau88] and Butterfield’s
‘counterpart-theoretic substantivalism’ [But89] can, I think, be viewed as selectivist sub-
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now introduce the barest outlines of the recent work conducted in the ‘new
variables’ for general relativity.
3 Connections, Loops and Spin-Networks.
Loop quantum gravity is a non-perturbative, background-independent quant-
ization of general relativity. In this paper am interested in the space of
quantum states that is provided by the spin-network basis: elements of this
space are taken to represent quantum excitations of the geometry of space.
The loop representation of quantum gravity begins with the (classical) con-
nection representation. Here, rather than using the metric on space as a
configuration variable (as above), the trick is to use an SU(2)-connection Aia
on space (again represented by a compact 3-surface Σ). The phase space is
then formed by taking orthonormal triads E˜ai as the momenta—note that it is
these rather than the connection that determine the geometry of space.8 The
fundamental degrees of freedom of the theory are then given by holonomies
of Aia and E˜ai .
The two canonical variables are related to the geometrodynamical form-
alism as follows: E˜ai (x) is equivalent to the square root of the 3-metric gab(x)
of constant time hypersurfaces. Aia is given by:
Aia(x) = Γ
i
a(x) + γK
i
a(x) (4)
where Γia(x) is the spin-connection associated to a basis; γ is the so-called
Immirzi parameter9; and Kia(x) is the extrinsic curvature of a constant time
hypersurface.
stantivalist interpretations of the phase space of general relativity. Maidens [Mai93] and
Hoefer’s [Hoe96] ‘primitive-identity denying substantivalists’ can be viewed as giving in-
direct interpretations. And Pooley’s ‘anti-haecceitistic substantivalist’ [Poo02] can be
seen as offering a reductive interpretation (I would place Brighouse [Bri94] and Saunders
[Sau02] in this category too). See Pooley (ibid.) for a recent detailed discussion.
8The tilde above the E-field refers to the fact that E is ‘denisitized’, i.e. ρ(E) = 1;
i = 1, 2, 3 are ‘internal’ indices labelling the 3-axis of a local triad (a triad is a 3-dimensional
orthonormal frame, related to the metric by ηabeaµe
b
ν = gµν); and, a = 1, 2, 3 are spatial
indices.
9This parameter functions like a Lagrange multiplier (like the Lapse function and the
shift vector), its value determines the nature of the number field the theory is defined over.
We work in the real (Barbero connection) theory where γ = 1; the Ashtekar formulation
uses the complex connection defined by setting γ = i.
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In contrast to the holonomies of the connection representation, the best
candidates for the canonical variables of loop quantum gravity are Wilson
loops. Given a connection Aia, a Wilson loop is just the trace of the holonomy
of Aia around a loop γ in space, written trP exp
∮
γ
Aia.10 The holonomies
contain all of the gauge-invariant information of the connection; as Gambini
and Pullin point out (1996: 2), “[k]nowledge of the holonomy for any closed
curve ... allows one ... to reconstruct the connection at any point of the base
manifold up to a gauge transformation”. However, the holonomies themselves
are not gauge-invariant; the Wilson loops are and in consequence they solve
the Gauss law constraint (from the SU(2)-connection) in a rather natural
way.
When Aia is quantized the Wilson loops receive an interpretation in
terms of operators on a Hilbert space spanned by spin-networks; these spin-
networks yield a representation of the (kinematical) quantum geometry of
space. Mathematically a spin-network S is a triple {Γ, si, vi}, where Γ is a
graph composed of i links and i − 2 nodes; s is a half-integer (of course,
this is where the “spin” in “spin-network” comes from); and v is a basis in
some linear (though not necessarily Hilbert) space. To each link is assigned
a ‘colour’ si; that is, an irreducible representation of SU(2), or, more simply,
a half-integer (the half-integers ‘label’ the representation). To each node (i.e.
the point at which the links meet) is assigned an intertwiner v (intertwiners
are operators that are invariant under some group action, in this case SU(2)
transformations). More precisely, the intertwiners form a (finite dimensional)
vector space V the basis elements vi of which correspond to the nodes.
The idea is that to each spin-network there is assigned a quantum state
of the gravitational field, or, alternatively, a quantum state for the geometry
of space. The ‘spins’ correspond to the units of area carried by the link and
the ‘intertwiners’ correspond to units of volume: both quantities are quant-
ized. The physical picture is based on intersections of spin-networks (links
and nodes) with surfaces and regions: the more links and nodes there are,
the more area and volume there is. Thus, Rovelli claims that we can view
each spin-network “as an elementary ‘quantum chunk of space”’, where “the
10Formulated in this way, general relativity bears many mathematical similarities to
the theories of the other forces of nature (as described by gauge theories). In each case
the basic dynamical variables are Wilson loops of connections on a principle bundle. The
crucial difference, of course, concerns the background independence of general relativity (i.e.
the fact that in general relativity the connection in is viewed as living on a differentiable
manifold, rather than a metric manifold).
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links represent (transverse) surfaces separating quanta of space” (2001: 110).
Moreover, he claims that “the spin-network[s] represent relational quantum
states: they are not located in space”; rather “[l]ocalization must be defined
in relation to them” (ibid.). However, below I argue that a very different
interpretation of this state of affairs can be given; there is nothing ‘intrins-
ically’ relational about spin-networks, and the fact that they admit a hole
argument highlights this fact.
4 Constraints in the Loop Representation.
As in the metric representation we find that general relativity is a con-
strained theory. However, in the connection and loop representations there
are three constraints: (1) diffeomorphism, (2) Hamiltonian, and (3) Gauss.
(1) generates infinitesimal displacements (spatial diffeomorphisms) of the ini-
tial data tangentially to the initial data slice Σ; (2) generates infinitesimal
displacements of the data normal to the initial data slice; and (3) generates
SO(3) gauge transformations. These constraints enforce the condition that
the states of the theory be diffeomorphism-invariant, gauge-invariant func-
tionals of the connection A. As I mentioned above, a natural set of such
states proceeds from first defining the holonomy of a connection and then
forming the Wilson loop. In more detail, the holonomy Hγ(a1, a2) for a curve
γ : [0, 1]→ Σ is given by:
Hγ(a1, a2) = P exp[−
∫ a2
a1
dl
dxi(l)
dl
Ai] (5)
The Wilson loop tr[Hγ(0, 1)] is then gauge-invariant when γ is a closed curve.
The diffeomorphism constraints acts on Wilson loops and spin-networks in
much the same way that they act on the metric in the context of the original
hole argument; namely, by reshuffling the points of the manifold so that the
location of the spin-network is not preserved. Thus, one can drag a spin-
network around in the manifold just as if it were a metric field.
The diffeomorphism invariance (as represented by the diffeomorphism
constraint) of general relativity effectively functions as a constraint on the
possible operators of the quantum theory. The notion of a correlation be-
comes an integral part of the definition of these operators. For example,
the area operator associated to the classical phase function, A(S) =
∫
S
|
E3iE
3i |1/2 d2x (with S a smooth 2-surface), is understood as a sum over
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intersections of a spin-network with a surface. One of the truly novel and
exciting aspects of loop quantum gravity is the result that the spectra of
these ‘geometrical’ operators is discrete. For example, the eigenvalues for
the area operator are given by:
Aˆ = 8piG ~ γ Σi=1,n
√
ji(ji + 1) (6)
where the terms ji are the links from the spin-network. The physical picture
is simply a quantized version of what we have for the classical picture: as
I already pointed out, the links of the spin-networks are seen as carrying
quanta of area and the nodes as carrying quanta of volume. However, as
these expressions stand they are clearly not gauge-invariant; they are defined
for surfaces and regions on a compact space. Thus, we need to be careful with
the discrete geometry result. The operators corresponding to the classical
expression for the area and volume of a spatial surface or region do not
commute with the constraints; in particular, they are not invariant under the
transformations generated by the diffeomorphism constraints. Hence, they
cannot correspond to genuine physical observables; they cannot be measured.
Thus, in the quantum theory, these operators do not admit a representation
on the solution space. However, if we take the operators to correspond to the
area and surface of some physically defined surface or region, then they are
invariant, and they can be constructed as operators on the space of solutions.
Though the introduction of ‘material’ variables might strike some as courting
relationalism, there need be no such implication; a position can be set up
that does not privilege matter over space.11 Moreover, the sophisticated
substantivalist options I mentioned above can be made to square with this
too.
However, there remains the problem of imposing the constraints (now
considered as quantum constraints) from the gauge freedom of the classical
theory. These are imposed as operator constraints in the quantum theory
(a´ la Dirac quantization), such that all physical states must be annihilated
by them. The Gauss law constraint is satisfied by any loop state, since the
formulation is intrinsically gauge invariant).12 As for the diffeomorphism
11I outline and defend such a view in (Rickles [Ric05])) where I apply it to the problem
of time. An alternative is to use the invariants of the gravitational field itself to ground
the required intersections.
12This feature motivates the application of the loop description to Yang-Mills theories
where the Gauss constraint is the only constraint to solve. See Bru¨gmann [Bru94].
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constraint, it is the case that a state Ψ[γ] is annihilated by its action just
in case Ψ[γ] = Ψ[γ′] whenever γ and γ′ are connected by a diffeomorphism.
Here a relation to knot theory becomes apparent, since a diffeomorphism
(equivalence) class of loops is characterized by a knot. Thus, the physical
states of the loop representation depend on loops in virtue of the knot class
defined by the loops. In terms of the spin-networks, the diffeomorphism
constraints can be seen as dragging the graph around in Σ. Solving the con-
straints amounts to a ‘disregarding’ of the specific points of the manifold in
which the network is embedded. The states depend on knots (equivalence
classes of spin-networks or ‘s-knots’). However, as I intimated at above, this
is conceptually—i.e. as regards the ontology of space vis-a`-vis the substant-
ivalist/relationalist debate—no different to the case of a metric field on a
manifold used in Earman and Norton’s hole argument. The idea that the
states depend on the knot class is, more or less, tantamount to a state’s be-
ing dependent on an equivalence class of metrics; but that offered just one
solution to the hole argument–there are many other resolutions that do not
rely on the equivalence class; even in the case of those that do so rely, the
determined substantivalist is at liberty to occupy it too.
5 A Hole Argument for Spin Networks.
The original motivation behind Penrose’s introduction of spin networks was
the desire to have an account of the quantum geometry of space that was
both discrete and relational (cf. Smolin [Smo97]: 3). Spin-networks enter
the picture of loop quantum gravity because they are found to label the
states that span the space L2(A/G) of gauge-equivalent connections on a
spatial manifold. Let me now attempt to connect this to the hole argument.
The treatment of the diffeomorphism constraint is really at the root of
any hole argument for general relativity. The problem in the metric-variable
case is most easily and most often resolved by shifting to the equivalence class
of metrics related by diffeomorphism (as mentioned above). This amounts to
solving the constraints; one removes the symmetry and the supposed redund-
ancy in the description of the location of the metric relative to the manifold.
Localization of fields is thus relativized and, the story goes, the location of
embedding of the field in the manifold is a gauge freedom in the theory. A
similar story can be told with regard to spin-networks, and, once again, the
root is the diffeomorphism constraint. Thus, one solves the constraints—after
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quantization—by shifting to equivalence classes of spin-networks related by
diffeomorphism so that the quantum states depend only upon the s-knot
class (where an s-knot is an equivalence class of spin-networks that can be
deformed into each other by a diffeomorphism).
Curiously, and, in terms of interpreting loop quantum gravity, crucially,
all of the logic of the hole argument applies equally well here13: the dif-
feomorphisms act on spin-networks by dragging them around in the mani-
fold. The spin-networks are diffeomorphism-invariant so they do not ‘register’
these draggings. Hence, the desire of many physicists to simply eradicate the
manifold and claim a victory for relationalism. But this underlying motiva-
tion and excuse to dispense with the manifold is exactly the same as it was
with in the classical theory based on the metric field. Consider the following
passage:
In going from the spin-network state | S〉 to the s-knot state | s〉, we
preserve the information in | S〉 except for it’s location in Σ. This
is the quantum analog to the fact that physically indistinguishable
solutions of the classical Einstein equation are not fields but equi-
valence classes of fields under diffeomorphisms. It reflects the core
of the conceptual revolution of general relativity: spatial localization
concerns only the relative location of the dynamical fields, and their
location in a background space. Accordingly, the s-knot states are not
quantum excitations in space, they are quantum excitations of space.
An s-knot does not reside “somewhere”: the s-knot itself defines the
“where”. [ [FR04]: 5]
The hole argument can be constructed simply by noting that Einstein’s equa-
tion cannot determine where spin-networks are in the manifold. Thus, for
any specification of initial data 〈Σ0, S〉, the Einstein equation will fail to de-
termine the data at Σt>0 since many diffeomorphic solutions will solve the
equation. But that this implies that the loop representation spells victory
for relationalism is as much as a non sequiter as it is for the metric in the
classical case, for precisely the same reasons given by sophisticated substant-
ivalists: we need not necessarily shift to the equivalence classes; and even
if we do, the substantivalist is able to accommodate this either by being
13To the best of my knowledge, no one has picked up on this yet; though it is implicitly
suggested in a number of works (the paper by Fairburn & Rovelli [FR04]containing the
passage below for example).
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selectivist (roughly corresponding to a gauge fixing procedure) or else anti-
haecceitistic (i.e. deny that the diffeomorphic possibilities brought about
by the application of the diffeomorphism constraint correspond to distinct
possible worlds).
Why might loop quantum gravity be seen as lending (unique) support
to relationalism? I think that there are two lines of reasoning. The first
goes as follows: Diff(Σ) acts on spin-networks s in such a way that φ(s) = s.
Thus, the diffeomorphism group is a symmetry and allows the formation of
equivalence classes of diffeomorphic spin-networks [s], such that s′ = φ(s)→
s, s′ ∈ [s]. Now, Rovelli calls these diffeomorphism-equivalence classes of
embedded spin-networks an “abstract spin-network” or “s-knot” and claims
that it can be understood as a spin-network that has been ‘smeared’ out
over space. This much is familiar from the old hole arguments where a
standard response—indeed, the response of most physicists—is to shift to
the geometry, the equivalence class of metrics modulo the diffeomorphism
symmetry. Taking the geometry as the true representation of a state of
spacetime amounts to reduction in phase space terms: one factors out the
symmetry and thus reduces out those states related by diffeomorphism. This
reduction is, of course, the mathematical analogue of Leibniz equivalence
which is based on the idea that indiscernible states should be identified.
Finally, this reduction is associated with relationalism about spacetime.
The second line of reasoning is based on the relationship between spin-
networks and determinations of length, area, and volume of physical surfaces
and regions of space. Thus, Rovelli claims that “the picture of quantum
spacetime that emerges from loop quantum gravity” is characterized by “an
abstract graph [that] can be seen as an elementary quantum excitation of
space formed by “chunks” of space (the nodes) with quantized volume, sep-
arated by sheets (corresponding to the links), with quantized area ... [and
the] key point is that the graph does not live on a manifold” ( [GR01]: 312).
The idea was that these objects (surfaces and regions of space) are phys-
ical only on account of intersections with physical objects. Mathematically
speaking, the problem is caused by the spectrum of the area of a surface
spec(Aˆ[S]) (or volume of a region). This will only take on a non-zero value
when a spin-network (edge) intersects the physically defined surface. Now,
unless the surface S is defined by some physical field (possibly the invariants
of the metric field), the area of the surface will not be diffeomorphism invari-
ant for it will simply be a coordinate patch in Σ. In this case the spectrum
will be physically meaningless. Thus, the interpretation given to S is that it
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is a surface where a physical field takes on a non-vanishing value. However,
the nature of the physical objects is not spelled out. It is open to the sub-
stantivalist to claim that the gravitational field and space are one and the
same entity and use it in the definitions of the geometrical operators.14
6 Conclusion.
I hope to have shown that the hole argument is alive and well in quantum
gravity and that what goes for the old argument goes, mutatis mutandis,
for the new one. Both relationalism and substantivalism are workable and
plausible ways of dealing with the hole argument: relationalism is not the
only game in town and quantum gravity does nothing to compromise this.
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